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C H A P T E R  1
Winning and Losing in Counterproliferation
Zachary Davis and Michael Greene
What does “winning” look like in the current counterproliferation (CP) mission space? 
This book is rich with insights into the geopolitical context within which special 
operations forces (SOF) must operate. How is “winning” defined in this megacomplex, 
hyperdynamic operational environment, when SOF are finding their place in the broad 
context of US national security and defense policy? What metrics and measures of 
performance are even appropriate? How do we distinguish between success and 
failure in an endless gray zone where wars are unacknowledged? One SOCOM mission 
that provides a useful case study in winning and losing is countering weapons of 
mass destruction (CWMD). We examine what it means for SOF to “win” in the effort 
to prevent more countries (or groups) from acquiring nuclear, chemical, or biological 
weapons and to mitigate the consequences if they do. 
Nonproliferation (NP) refers to the mainly diplomatic efforts to persuade countries 
not to acquire weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The primary nonproliferation 
tools are security guarantees, alliances, multilateral agreements, international 
organizations, treaties, and global norms. Superficially, nonproliferation appears 
easy to measure: either a country gets WMD or it doesn’t. In practice, however, 
countries may either acquire the capabilities needed to produce WMD covertly or 
develop latent production infrastructure that enables them to produce the necessary 
materials without violating any rules. Traditionally, preventing countries from crossing 
the boundary between civilian and military applications is considered a win for those 
trying to maintain global nonproliferation standards. 
For SOCOM’s CWMD mission, illicit acquisition of WMD production capabilities 
falls under the upstream defeat category. Wins and losses are measured in terms 
of a particular country or group’s progress toward having WMD options. For example, 
persuading Japan or South Korea not to use their civilian nuclear infrastructure to 
produce nuclear weapons is a nonproliferation win. Failure to prevent them, or North 
Korea, or Iraq, from using their civilian nuclear capabilities to advance their covert 
weapons programs rank as NP failures. Iran hangs in the balance. But SOCOM would 
not have played much role in these failed nonproliferation efforts because SOF would 
not normally play a leading role in blocking illicit transfers of dual-use equipment, and 
no policy directive authorized attacks on their facilities. Where does SOF come into 
the picture?
Counterproliferation is oriented toward countries or groups that evade NP efforts 
and acquire WMD capabilities. “Winning” or “losing” in this context is harder to 
measure but focuses on limiting adversary abilities to deploy or use WMD in ways 
that threaten US interests. This is often a losing battle against a determined 
proliferator who is willing to resist NP pressures and pay the price required to get 
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WMD technologies. For example, Pakistan, India, North Korea, and Iran defied 
international pressure to advance their WMD aspirations. Counterproliferation 
includes policies and actions to roll back, disrupt, contain, and cope with adversary 
WMD programs that are advancing toward possession and stockpiling of nuclear, 
chemical, and biological weapons and delivery systems. This includes upstream 
efforts against latent programs that give the possessor the option of rapidly 
transforming civilian infrastructure into military weapons. For nuclear weapons, this 
includes the ability to enrich uranium or reprocess plutonium from spent reactor 
fuel. For chemical and biological weapons, CP focusses on industrial production 
of chemicals and pharmaceuticals for a wide variety of civilian purposes. If CP 
starts after NP has failed, SOF contributions to CP might be doomed to fail unless 
decision-makers are willing to authorize direct action against industrial sites, as 
occurred in the case of Israel’s bombing of a covert Syrian reactor in 2007, the 
Stuxnet episode that disrupted Iran’s centrifuges at Natanz, and possibly the 
reported 2020 damage at that same facility.1 However, short of direct action, a 
more circumspect definition would give credit to disruption, interdiction, and other 
measures designed to slow down and complicate the weaponization process.
Categorizing SOF Priorities
Importantly, CWMD is a Department of Defense (DOD) construct not shared 
throughout the US government (USG). Most agencies are organized around NP and 
CP terminology, so measuring CWMD differs from either of the more established 
concepts. Therefore, determining the success or failure of SOCOM’s role in DOD 
CWMD starts with identifying what is included in the SOF mission space—and what 
is not. SOF priorities fall into three categories: crisis response, pathway defeat,  
and early detection.
Crisis Response
Crisis response refers to the quick-reaction, technically prepared, and highly trained 
units that would be deployed to assess and render safe WMD that are not under 
the control of a nation-state. SOCOM has long prepared for such “loose-nuke” 
scenarios. The United States possesses a robust domestic and overseas CWMD 
crisis-response capability comprising numerous teams from various departments 
across the USG. Significant communication and collaboration exists across the 
crisis-response enterprise, resulting in a formidable whole-of-government capability 
postured for success. Nevertheless, there is room for improvement in the policy and 
communication aspects of the crisis-response mission, which we address later in 
this chapter. 
Pathway Defeat
While the crisis-response effort is mature, robust, and coordinated across the whole 
of government, pathway defeat is a relatively new addition to the SOCOM lexicon, 
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although the term originated within the Naval Special Warfare community. For 
pathway defeat, operators trace back the proliferation networks and technological 
pathways that support the development of WMD programs to target critical nodes. 
Key DOD strategy documents embody this approach.2 As we shall see, this mission 
space is already crowded with interagency collaboration, and the SOF role remains 
largely a work in progress. 
Early Detection
Winning in CWMD depends on early detection. CWMD is not only crisis-response and/
or pathway-defeat capabilities but also a coalition of foreign partners who possess 
similar (if not exact) capabilities able to detect and counter these threats away from 
the homeland. Essential to this vision is the USG and DOD’s ability to exchange 
technological capabilities, communicate openly, and share sensitive intelligence. 
Outdated policies and a lack of requisite authorities prevent the effective and timely 
exchange of technology and/or intelligence.
Defining SOF Priorities for Success in CWMD
NP and CP focus generally on countries attempting to acquire prohibited weapons 
illicitly. While much attention has been given to the idea of “moving to the left of 
boom” to prevent adversaries from acquiring WMD capabilities in the first place—
the nonproliferation realm—early detection and interdiction of WMD production 
equipment is already covered by an existing whole-of-government approach.3 SOCOM 
can contribute to these ongoing efforts but is not replacing or competing with them 
via its concept of upstream defeat. A win for SOCOM in this mission space comes 
from supporting the coordinated efforts of intelligence, diplomatic, financial, and law 
enforcement agencies. 
SOCOM has a rich legacy of such support in counterterror and counterdrug 
missions and can play a critical but niche role in executing CP policy. However, CP 
policy priorities are set by policy decisions, so relevant resources and authorities 
are directed and coordinated according to White House policy directives. In practice, 
this means no agency or department, including SOCOM and its subelements, is 
entirely free to pursue disruptive upstream actions without policy guidance. By 
contrast, SOCOM elements play a preeminent role in most crisis-response actions, 
although those too are guided by White House oversight and direction. Crisis-
response roles and responsibilities are more clearly defined for nuclear weapons 
and less stringent with respect to actions involving chemical weapons, especially 
with respect to contaminated operational environments such as in Syria, where 
force-protection considerations are a priority. Biological threats present increasingly 
complex problems for readiness, whether human-made or naturally occurring. The 
ability to execute missions successfully in a WMD battlefield would constitute a 
major win for SOF. Conversely, the inability to execute missions because of WMD 
use, or threatened use, must be considered a loss. Advancements in detection, 
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personnel protective equipment (PPE), vaccines, decontamination, and other force-
protection technologies are needed to limit the impact on SOF mission execution, 
whether focused on CP objectives or other urgent priorities.
As SOCOM adjusts its focus from CT to major-power competition, the SOF role 
in countering the WMD systems of peer competitors remains unclear, but would 
present major challenges. For example, upstream defeat has not traditionally 
focused on the strategic systems of de jure nuclear-weapon states, as defined 
under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Interdiction 
of proliferation networks and materials is directed mainly at nations and groups 
attempting to acquire WMD beyond the scope of their treaty commitments. 
Similarly, no major power admits to possessing chemical weapons, and all but a 
few countries have forsworn them via obligations under the Chemical Weapons 
Convention. Similarly, the Biological Weapons Convention outlaws all offensive 
biological weapons, but it lacks verification and enforcement mechanisms. SOCOM 
CWMD efforts are naturally directed at such illicit nuclear, chemical, and biological 
programs as part of the broader NP/CP policy of the USG. Winning in that context 
generally means contributing to the overall success of interagency collaboration.
Two Levels of Threat: Tactical and Strategic 
These CP, NP, and CWMD issues can usefully be divided into two categories: tactical 
and strategic. There is a significant gap between the tactical capability to protect 
against or defeat a limited chemical threati and a strategic threat from a yield-
producing nuclear device that can be delivered on a missile. When assessing wins 
and losses, priority must be given to strategic threats that carry potential to damage 
the homeland and the American way of life significantly. One can imagine a wide 
range of nuclear, chemical, or biological threats that could achieve strategic effects, 
including economic and political damage. These contrast with important tactical 
threats that merit a vigorous response but are less likely to cause irreparable harm 
to core American interests. Below we outline several strategic threats that merit 
high priority for CWMD policy and operations and give examples of tactical threats 
that fall below the threshold of vital interest.
A Sampler of Strategic Threats from WMD: A SOF Perspective
Loose Nukes from Anywhere
A key element of existing and ongoing SOCOM responsibility in CWMD is the threat 
of “loose nukes”: nuclear weapons not under the control of the nation that produced 
them. Because of the harm that a single such weapon could do to US or allied/
partner forces, locating and disarming these weapons must rank as a top priority 
and a “no fail” mission for SOF. As stockpiles of nuclear weapons grow, the risk also 
i   For example, ISIS chemical weapons use in Iraq and Syria.
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increases that imperfect security measures will result in a weapon being removed 
from custody. Growing arsenals in Russia, India, China, Pakistan, North Korea, and 
perhaps elsewhere could present appealing targets for those seeking to acquire a 
nuclear weapon. The render-safe mission also includes improvised devises either 
based on a stolen state weapon or constructed from illicitly acquired weapons-
usable nuclear materials. This mission has rightfully ranked as a top priority for 
many years, and American SOF are positioned to win. However, current capabilities 
are limited and could be overwhelmed if more than a few weapons were to escape 
from custody and require multiple, simultaneous render-safe operations. 
North Korea
While any hostile state that possesses the ability to threaten the US homeland with 
nuclear weapons must be considered a strategic threat, North Korea combines a 
number of factors that puts it in a class of its own. Historical animosities, the US-
South Korean alliance, regional allies and adversaries, the risk of conventional war, 
and Pyongyang’s decades-long commitment to its WMD programs have all made NP, 
CP and CWMD largely ineffective against North Korea’s continued advancement of 
its WMD and missile programs. Despite successful interdiction efforts, determined 
proliferators overcome CP obstacles. Moreover, coping with North Korea’s WMD 
during a war poses daunting challenges. In our view, the USG, DOD, and SOF are not 
postured for success and could actually fail to prevent a catastrophe if North Korea 
is able to use its WMD against the United States, South Korea, or Japan. 
Peer Competitors
As stated previously, NP, CP, and CWMD policy has not focused on disrupting the 
WMD systems of peer competitors in peacetime. The presumption that deterrence 
is essentially a defense posture suggests major power’s WMD are not intended as 
first-strike weapons. Of course, in wartime, limiting damage on the US homeland, 
troops, and allies makes foreign WMD systems fair game. Blunting Warsaw Pact 
WMD use in Europe was a US priority during the Cold War, one that diminished 
as Soviet forces withdrew. A reevaluation of peer and near-peerii competitor WMD 
threats could suggest reprioritization of the threats from existing stockpiles. 
Biological Wildcards
Whether of natural or human-made origin, biological hazards can cause strategic 
effects. As such, preparedness should be a national priority, and SOF should take 
steps to remain effective in the event of a wide spectrum of biological threats. To do 
less is to accept failure. 
ii   At least in terms of WMD capabilities.
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A Sampler of Tactical Challenges from WMD: A SOF Perspective
Loose Chemical Weapons: A Tactical Problem
The term WMD lumps together a wide variety of dissimilar problems. Because of the 
challenges associated with using chemical weapons successfully on the battlefield, 
national chemical weapons programs may not constitute a strategic threat to the 
United States. Terrorist use of chemical weapons against military or civilian targets 
also is likely to be limited in its destructive effects. We believe terrorist use of 
chemical weapons would not necessarily meet the standard of strategic effects. 
Therefore, loss of control over chemical weapons, as was the case in Syria, should 
be considered a tactical threat. In the case of Syrian, ISIS’s, and other group’s 
use of CW in Iraq and Syria, the USG and DOD, specifically, enjoy a significant 
competitive advantage, as PPE is able to protect operators and render the enemy’s 
chemical weapons ineffective. This constitutes a tactical win. 
Radiological Weapons Not Strategic
Radiological dispersal devices have little military value and are mainly effective 
in producing fear in civilian populations. Granted, widespread fear of radiological 
exposure could be disruptive, including significant potential for economic harm. 
However, these are considered manageable risks that do not constitute strategic 
threats to the United States and are unlikely to undermine the effectiveness of 
SOF operations. Moreover, multiagency investments in consequence-management 
methods are in place to limit the effects of radiological hazards. We consider this a 
win against a tactical threat. 
Biological Risks Can Be Managed
Many lessons can be drawn from the Covid-19 pandemic. For SOF, longstanding 
focus on readiness contrasts with the preparations that could have greatly reduced 
the impact of COVID-19 on society at large. But for SOF, aggressive force-protection 
procedures, vaccines, monitoring, and other specialized equipment can greatly 
reduce the threat posed by biological hazards, rendering them more of a tactical 
than a strategic threat. This, too, constitutes and important win for SOF.
What It Takes for SOF to Win against WMD
Counterproliferation is a team sport. Success requires the full range of USG 
capabilities and authorities to cover the full WMD development cycle, from cradle 
to grave, inception to employment. The selection of targets—which countries 
and proliferation networks to counter—and the methods used against them are 
policy decisions. The toolbox available to policy makers includes both positive 
and negative economic incentives, diplomatic agreements (such as the Joint 
Comprehensive Plan of Action with Iran or the Agreed Framework with North Korea), 
multilateral treaties such as the NPT and CWC, positive and negative security 
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assurances, and cooperative measures (such as Cooperative Threat Reduction [CTR] 
programs and the Proliferation Security Initiative [PSI]). Specific actions can include 
interdiction, sanctions, export controls, diplomatic engagement, military show 
of force, alliance cooperation, and covert action. Each of these depends on the 
specific skills, authorities, and resources available to the appropriate agencies of 
the USG, usually from the State, Defense, Treasury, Energy, Justice, and Commerce 
Departments as well as the intelligence community. Where do the activities of DOD, 
SOCOM, and its SOF elements fit in this mix? 
US SOF possess a number of specialized skill sets that can contribute to the 
overall CP policy effort. Some are well-known and longstanding within the CP/
CWMD community, such as the render-safe mission, countering terrorist WMD, and 
the ability to interdict ships suspected of carrying illicit cargo. Other capabilities, 
however, have not been exploited fully for CP purposes. For example, SOF teams 
regularly access remote areas where intelligence about local WMD-related facilities, 
organizations, and people may be hard to collect. Also, SOF training, support, and 
collaboration with local military and law enforcement provides an ideal platform for 
sharing best practices for a wide range of CP skills, as is done via CTR, PSI, and 
other partnership-building activities. Foreign internal defense training and exercises 
could include CP-related training modules where appropriate. Psychological 
operations could influence local perspectives on WMD, portray proliferation 
network operatives as corrupt, and support cooperative efforts. Preparation of the 
operational environment could be instrumental in planning CP operations, especially 
in hard-to-reach areas. A win for SOF would be to fill additional niche roles in the 
overall USG CP policy. A win for DOD CWMD is to bolster interagency collaboration 
on NP and CP.4
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